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Abstract 
Common wisdom has it that small distinc­
tions in the probabilities quantifying a belief 
network do not matter much for the results of 
probabilistic queries. Yet, one can develop re­
alistic scenarios under which small variations 
in network probabilities can lead to signifi­
cant changes in computed queries. A pend­
ing theoretical question is then to analyti­
cally characterize parameter changes that do 
or do not matter. In this paper, we study the 
sensitivity of probabilistic queries to changes 
in network parameters and prove some tight 
bounds on the impact that such parameters 
can have on queries. Our analytical results 
pinpoint some interesting situations under 
which parameter changes do or do not mat­
ter. These results are important for knowl­
edge engineers as they help them identify in­
fluential network parameters. They also help 
explain some of the previous experimental re­
sults and observations with regards to net­
work robustness against parameter changes. 
1 Introduction 
Automated reasoning systems based on belief networks 
[9, 6] have become quite popular recently as they have 
enjoyed much success in a number of real-world appli­
cations. Central to the development of such systems 
is the construction of a belief network that faithfully 
represents the domain of interest. Although the au­
tomatic synthesis of belief networks-based on design 
information in certain applications and based on learn­
ing techniques in others-have been drawing a lot of 
attention recently, mainstream methods for construct­
ing such networks continue to be based on traditional 
knowledge engineering (KE) sessions involving domain 
experts. One of the central issues that arise in such 
KE sessions is to assess the impact that changes to 
network parameters may have on queries of interest. 
We have recently developed a sensitivity analysis tool, 
called SAMIAM (Sensitivity Analysis, Modeling, In­
ference And More), which allows domain experts to 
fine tune network parameters in order to enforce con­
straints on the results of certain queries. For exam­
ple, it may turn out that Pr(y I e)/ Pr(z I e) == 2 
with respect to a given belief network, while the do­
main expert believes that the ratio Pr(y I e)/ Pr(z I e) 
should be equal to 3. SAMIAM will then automati­
cally decide whether a given parameter is relevant to 
this constraint, and if it is, will compute the minimum 
amount of change to that parameter which is needed 
to enforce the constraint. 1 
As we experimented with SAMIAM, we ran into scenar­
ios that we found to be quite surprising. Specifically, 
there were many occasions in which queries would be 
quite sensitive to very small variations in certain net­
work parameters. 
Example 1.1 Consider Figure 1, whick depicts a 
screen shot of SAMIAM. The depicted network has 
six binary variables, each of which has the values true 
and false. There are two query variables of interest 
here, fire and tampering. Suppose that the evidence e 
is report, smoke: people are reported to be evacuating a 
building (in response to an alarm), but there is no evi­
dence for any smoke. This evidence should make tQ.m­
pering more likely than fire, and the given belief net­
work did indeed reflect this since Pr( tampering I e) = 
.50 and Pr(fire I e) = .03 in this case. We wanted, 
1 We use the following standard notation: variables are 
denoted by upper-case letters (A) and their values by 
lower-case letters (a). Sets of variables are denoted by 
bold-face upper-case letters (A) and their instantiations 
are denoted by bold-face lower-case letters (a). For a 
variable A with values true and false, we use a to denote 
A = true and a to denote A =false. Finally, for a vari­
able X with parents U, we use Bxlu to denote the network 
parameter corresponding to Pr(x I u). 
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Figure 1: A sensitivity analysis scenario. 
however, for the probability of tampering to be no less 
than .65 (that is, Pr( tampering I e) - Pr( tampering I 
e) � .30). SAMIAM recommended two ways to achieve 
this:2 
1. either increase the prior probability of tampering 
by .016 or more (from its current value of .02), or 
2. decrease the probability of a false report, 
Pr( report I leaving), by .005 or more (from its 
current value of .01). 
Therefore, the distinctions between .02 and .036, and 
the one between .01 and .005, do really matter in this 
case as each induces an absolute change of .15 on the 
probabilistic query of interest. 
Later, we show an example where an infinitesimal 
change to a network parameter leads to a change of 
.5 to a corresponding query. We also show examples 
in which the relative change in the probability of a 
query is larger than the corresponding relative change 
in a network parameter. One wonders then whether 
there is a different method for measuring probabilistic 
change (other than absolute or relative), which allows 
2Implicit in the recommendation of SAMlAM is that the 
parameters of variables fire, smoke, leaving, and alarm are 
irrelevant to enforcing the given constraint. 
one to non-trivially bound the change in a probabilis­
tic query in terms of the corresponding change in a 
network parameter. 
To answer these and similar questions, we conduct in 
this paper an analytic study of the derivative 8Pr(y I 
e)/8rxlu• where Txiu is a meta parameter that allows us 
to simultaneously change co-varying parameters such 
as exJu and Oxtu· Our study leads us to three main 
results: 
• Theorem 3.1, which provides a bound on the 
derivative 8Pr(y I e)/8rxlu in terms of Pr(y I e) 
and Pr(x I u) only. 
• Theorem 3.2, which proves a bound on the sen­
sitivity of queries to infinitesimal changes in net­
work parameters. 
• Theorem 3.3, which proves a bound on the sensi­
tivity of queries to arbitrary changes in network 
parameters. 
The last theorem shows that the amount of change 
in a probabilistic query can be bounded in terms of 
the amount of change in a network parameter, as long 
as change is understood to be the relative change in 
odds. This result has a number of practical implica­
tions. First, it can relief experts from having to be 
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too precise when specifying certain parameters sub­
jectively. Next, it can be important for approximate 
inference algorithms that pre-process network parame­
ters to eliminate small distinctions in such parameters 
(in order to increase the efficiency of inference [10]). 
Finally, it can be used to show that automated reason­
ing systems based on belief networks are robust and, 
hence, suitable for real-world applications [11]. 
This paper is structured as follows. We present in 
Section 2 a technique for automatically identifying 
minimal parameter changes that are needed to ensure 
certain constraints on probabilistic queries. We then 
study analytically in Section 3 the impact of parameter 
changes on query changes, providing a series of results 
in this direction. Section 4 is then dedicated to ex­
ploring the implications of our results in Section 3; in 
particular, providing an analytic explanation of why 
certain parameter changes don't matter. We finally 
close in Section 5 with some concluding remarks. Proof 
sketches of theorems are given in Appendix A, while 
full proofs can be found in [2]. 
2 The tuning of network parameters 
We report in this section on a tool that we have been 
developing, called SAMIAM for fine tuning network pa­
rameters [7]. Given a belief network, evidence e and 
two events y and z, where Y, Z t/. E, our tool can ef­
ficiently identify parameter changes needed to enforce 
the following types of constraints: 
DIFFERENCE: Pr(y I e) - Pr(z I e) � f. 
RATIO: Pr(y I e)/ Pr(z I e) �e. 
We discuss next how one would enforce the DIFFER­
ENCE constraint, which is very similar to enforcing the 
RATIO constraint. 
W hen considering the parameters of variables X, we 
assume that it only has two values x and x and, hence, 
two parameters Bxlu and lhru for each parent instan­
tiation u. Moreover, we assume that for each variable 
X and parent instantiation u we have a meta param­
eter rxlu• such that Bxlu = rxlu and Bx-ru = 1 - rxlu· 
Therefore, our goal is then to determine the amount of 
change to the meta parameter rxlu which would lead to 
a simultaneous change in both of Bxlu and f'lxru·3 Our 
results can be easily extended to multivalued variables, 
as long as we assume a model for changing co-varying 
parameters when one of them changes [3, 8]. But we 
leave that extension out to simplify the discussion. 
3It is not meaningful to change one of the parameters in 
ex/u, Ox1u without changing the other since 0,1u + Ox1u = 1. 
To enforce the DIFFERENCE constraint, we observe 
first that the probability of an instantiation e, Pr(e), is 
a linear function in any network parameter Bxlu [12, 1]. 
In fact, the probability is also linear in any meta pa­
rameter 'Txlu and we have [2]: 
aPr( e) 
OTxiu 
Pr(e,x,u) Pr(e,x,u) 
exlu &xiu 
(1) 
when Bxlu =f. 0 and lhru =f. 0.4 We will designate 
the above derivative by the constant a.,. Similarly, 
we will designate the derivatives 8Pr(y,e)/Elrxru and 
aPr(z, e)/8rxlu by the constants ay,e and az,e, respec­
tively: 
8Pr(y, e) Pr(y, e, x, u) Pr(y, e, x, u) 
(2) OTxiu Bxlu Oxru 
8Pr(z, e) Pr(z, e, x, u ) Pr(z, e, x, u) (3) 
OTxlu exlu (Jx]u 
Now, to ensure that Pr(y I e) - Pr(z I e) � E, it 
suffices to ensure that Pr(y,e)- Pr(z,e) � EPr(e). 
Suppose that the previous constraint does not hold, 
and we wish to establish it by applying a change of J 
to the meta parameter rxlu· Such a change leads to a 
change of a.,o in Pr(e). It also changes Pr(y, e) and 
Pr(z, e) by ay,eO and az,eO, respectively. Hence, to 
enforce the constraint, we need to solve for J in the 
following inequality: 
[Pr(y, e) +ay,eO]- [Pr(z, e)+ O'z,eO] � E[Pr(e) + aeJ] . 
Rearranging the terms, we get: 
Pr(y, e)- Pr(z, e)- EPr(e) � 
o[-ay,e + O'z,e + w .. ]. (4) 
Given Equations 1-4, we can then easily solve for the 
amount of change needed, J, once we know the follow­
ing probabilities Pr(y, e), Pr(z, e), Pr(e), Pr(e, x, u), 
Pr(e, x, u), Pr(y, e, x, u), Pr(y, e, x, u), Pr(z, e, x, u), 
and Pr(z, e, x, u). 
The question now is how to compute these probabil­
ities, efficiently, and for all meta parameters 7:�;1u as 
there ma.y be more than one possible parameter change 
that would enforce the given constraint; we need to 
identify all such parameters. 
Interestingly enough, if we have an algorithm that can 
compute Pr(i, x, u), for a given instantiation i and for 
all family instantiations x, u, then that algorithm can 
be used to evaluate Inequality 4 for every meta param­
eter 'Txlu· All we have to do is run the algorithm three 
4If either of the previous parameters is zero, we can use 
the differential approach in [3] to compute the derivative 
directly [2]. 
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times, once with i = e and then again with i = y, e and 
finally with i = z, e. Both the jointree algorithm [5] 
and the differential approach in [3] have the previous 
ability and can be used for this purpose. 
We present now another example to illustrate how the 
results above are used in practice. 
Example 2.1 Consider again the network in Fig­
ure 1. Here, we set the evidence such that we have 
smoke, but no report of people evacuating the build­
ing: e = smoke, report .  We then got the posteriors 
Pr(fire I e) = .25 and Pr(tampering I e) = .02. We 
thought in this case that the posterior on fire should 
be no less than .50 and asked SAMIAM to recommend 
the necessary changes to enforce this constraint. There 
were five recommendations in this case, three of which 
could be ruled out based on qualitative considerations: 
1. increase the prior on fire to � .03 (from .01}; 
2. increase the prior on tampering to � .80 (from 
.02}; 
3. decrease Pr(smoke I fire) to:-:::; .003 (from .01}; 
4. increase Pr(leaving I alarm) to � .923 (from 
.001); 
5. increase Pr(report I leaving) to� .776 (from .01}. 
Clearly, the only sensible changes here are either to 
increase the prior on fire, or to decrease the probability 
of having smoke without a fire. 
This example and other similar ones suggest that iden­
tifying such parameter changes and their magnitude is 
inevitable for developing faithful belief networks, yet 
is not trivial to accomplish by a visual inspection of 
the belief network and, hence, need to be facilitated 
by sensitivity analysis tools. Moreover, the examples 
illustrate the need to develop more analytic tools to 
understand and explain the sensitivity of queries to 
certain parameter changes. There is also a need to 
reconcile the sensitivities exhibited by our examples 
with previous experimental studies demonstrating the 
robustness of probabilistic queries against small pa­
rameter changes in certain application areas, such as 
diagnosis [11]. We address these particular questions 
in the next two sections. 
3 The sensitivity of probabilistic 
queries to parameters changes 
Our starting point in understanding the sensitivity of 
a query Pr(y I e) to changes in a meta parameter 
'Txju is to analyze the derivative 8Pr(y I e)/8-rxlu· In 
Figure 2: The plot of the upper bound on the partial 
derivative 8Pr(y I e)/8-rxlm as given in Theorem 3.1, 
against Pr(x I u) and Pr(y I e). 
our analysis, we assume that X is binary, but Y and 
all other variables in the network can be multivalued. 
The following theorem provides a simple bound on this 
derivative, in terms of Pr(y I e) and Pr(x I u) only. 
We then use this simple bound to study the effect of 
changes to meta parameters on probabilistic queries. 
Theorem 3.1 If X is a binary variable in a belief net­
work, then:5 1 8Pr(y I e) I < Pr(y I e)(l- Pr(y I e)) . OTxlu - Pr(x I u)(l- Pr(x I u)) 
We show later an example for which the derivative 
assumes the above bound exactly. 6 
The plot of this bound against Pr(x I u) and Pr(y I e) 
is shown in Figure 2. A number of observations are in 
order about this plot: 
• For extreme values of Pr(x I u), the bound 
approaches infinity, and thus a small absolute 
change in the meta parameter 'Txlu can have a big 
impact on the query Pr(y I e). 
• On the other hand, the bound approaches 0 for 
extreme values of the query Pr(y I e). Therefore, 
a small absolute change in the meta parameter 
5This theorem and all results that follow requires that 
'Txlu =I= 0 and 'Txlu =I= 1, since we can only use the expression 
in Equation 1 under these conditions. 
6Note that we have an exact closed form for the deriva­
tive aPr(y I e)/8-r,lu [3, 4], but that form includes terms 
which are specific to the given belief network. 
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Figure 3: The network used in Example 3.1. 
Txlu will have a small effect on the absolute change 
in the query. 
One of the implications of this result is that if we 
have a belief network where queries Pr(y I e) have ex­
treme values, then such networks will be robust against 
small changes in network parameters. This of course 
assumes that robustness is understood to be a small 
change in the absolute value of the given query. In­
terestingly enough, if y is a disease which is diagnosed 
by finding e-that is, the probability Pr(y I e) is quite 
high-then it is not surprising that such queries would 
be robust against small perturbations to network pa­
rameters. This seems to explain some of the results in 
[11], where robustness have been confirmed for queries 
with Pr(y I e) � .90. 
Another implication of the above result is that one 
has to be careful when changing parameters that are 
extreme. Such parameters are potentially very influ­
ential and one must handle them with care. 
Therefore, the worst situation from a robustness view­
point materializes if one has extreme parameters with 
non-extreme queries. In such a case, the queries can 
be very sensitive to small variations in the parameters. 
Example 3.1 Consider the network structure in Fig­
u're 3. We have two binary nodes, X andY with re­
spective parameters Ox, (}x and Oy, ()y. We assume that 
E is a deterministic binary node where the value of E 
is e iff X = Y. This dictates the following CPT forE: 
Pr(e I x, y) = 1, Pr(e I x,Y) = 1, Pr(e I x,y) = 0 and 
Pr(e 1 x, y) = 0. The conditional probability Pr(y I e) 
can be expressed using the root parameters ex and Oy 
as: 
()x()y Pr(y I e)= () e � ·  
X y + X y 
The derivative of this probability with respect to the 
meta parameter Tx is given by:7 
8Pr(y I e) 
O'Tx 
(
e
x()y + fhBy)()y- ()x(}y(ey- By) 
(()x()y + 8x0y)2 
&y&y 
7Note that BOx/BTo: = 1 and BOx;jfhx = -1. 
This is equal to the upper bound given in Theorem 3.1: 
Pr(y I e)(1- Pr(y I e)) 
Pr(x)(1- Pr(x)) BxO:x(&xOy + &#y)2 
&y&y 
Now, if we set ex = &y, the derivative becomes: 
8Pr(y I e) 1 
= -- , 4&x0x 
and as ex (or Ox) approaches 0, the derivative ap­
proaches infinity. Finally, if we set Ox = By = €, we 
have Pr(yle) = .5, but if we keep Oy and By constant 
and change Tx to 0, we get the new result Pr(yie) = 0. 
Example 3.1 then illustrates three points. First, it 
shows that the bound in Theorem 3.1 is tight in the 
above sense. Second, it gives an example network 
which the derivative 8Pr(y I e)/8Txlu tends to infinity. 
Finally, it shows that an infinitesimal absolute change 
in a parameter can induce a non-infinitesimal absolute 
change in some query. The following theorem, how­
ever, shows that this is not possible if we consider a 
relative notion of change. 
Theorem 3.2 Assume that Txlu ::; .5 without loss of 
generality. 8 Suppose that .6.rxlu is an infinitesimal 
change applied to the meta parameter Txlu' leading to 
a change of D..Pr(y I e) to the query Pr(y I e). We 
then have: I D..Pr(y I e) I < 2 1 D..Txlu I· 
Pr(y I e) - Txiu 
For a function f(x), the quantity: 
lim (x-xo)-0 
(f(x)- f(xo))/ f(xo) 
(x- xo)/xo 
is typically known as the sensitivity of f to x at xo. 
Theorem 3.2 is then showing that the sensitivity of 
Pr(y I e) to Txlu is bounded. 
As an example application of Theorem 3.2, consider 
Example 3.1 again. The change of Tx from € to 0 
amounts to a relative change I - (/t:l = 1. The cor­
responding change of Pr(y I e) from .5 to 0 amounts 
to a relative change of I- .5/.51 = 1.9 Hence, the rel­
ative change in the query is not as dramatic from this 
viewpoint. 
8For a binary variable X, if Txlu > .5, we can instead 
choose the meta parameter T:,;l u without loss of generality. 
9If we consider the meta parameter T:,; = 1 - E instead, 
the relative change in T:,; will then amount to �:/(1-�:). But 
Theorem 3.2 will not be applicable in this case (assuming 
that € is close to 0) since the theorem requires that the 
chosen meta parameter be :S .5. 
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The relative change in Pr(y I e) may be greater than 
double the relative change in Txlu for non-infinitesimal 
changes because the derivative fJPr(y I e)jorxlu de­
pends on the value of Txlu [3, 7]. Going back to Ex­
ample 3.1, if we set Ox = .5 and 8y = .01, we obtain 
the result Pr(y I e) = .01. If we now increase Tx to 
.6, a relative change of 20%, we get the new result 
Pr(y I e) = 0.0149, a relative change of 49%, which is 
more than double of the relative change in Tx· 
The question now is: Suppose that we change a meta 
parameter Txlu by an arbitrary amount (not an in­
finitesimal amount), what can we say about the corre­
sponding change in the query Pr(y I e)? We have the 
following result. 
Theorem 3.3 Let O(x I u) denote the odds of x given 
u: O(x I u) = Pr(x I u)/(1-Pr(x I u)) , and let O(y I 
e) denote the odds of y given e: O(y I e) = Pr(y I 
e)/(1- Pr(y I e)). Let O'(x I u) and O'(y I e) denote 
these odds after having applied an arbitrary change to 
the meta parameter Txlu where X is a binary variable 
in a beli ef network. If the change is positive, then: 
O(x I u) O'(y I e) O'(x I u) < < 
) l O'(x I u) - O(y I e) - O(x I u 
and if it is negative, then: 
O'(x I u) < O'(y I e) < O(x I u) 
O(x I u) - O(y I e) - O'(x I u) 
Combining both results, we have: 
lln(O'(y I e)) -ln(O(y I e))l S 
lln(O'(x I u) )  -ln(O(x I u)) l . 
Theorem 3.3 means that the relative change in the 
odds of y given e is bounded by the relative change 
in the odds of x given u. Note that the result makes 
no assumptions whatsoever about the structure of the 
given belief network. 
An interesting special case of the above result is when 
X is a root node and X =  Y. From basic probability 
theory, we have: 
Pr(e I x) 
O(x I e)= O(x) 
Pr(e I x) . 
As the ratio Pr(e I x)j Pr(e I x) is independent of 
Pr(x), the ratio O(x I e)jO(x) is also independent of 
this prior. Therefore, we can conclude that: 
O'(x I e) 
O(x I e) 
O'(x) 
O(x) 
· (5) 
This means we can find the exact amount of change 
needed for a meta parameter Tx in order to induce a 
particular change on the query Pr(x I e). There is no 
need to use the more expensive technique of Section 2 
in this case. 
Example 3.2 Consider the network in Figure 1. 
Suppose that e = report, smoke . Currently, 
Pr(tampering) = .02 and Pr(tampering I e) = 
.50. We wish to increase the conditional probability 
to .65. We can compute the new prior probability 
Pr' (tampering) using Equation 5: 
.65/.35 Pr'(tampering)/(1- Pr'(tampering)) 
.50/.50 - .98/.02 
giving us Pr' (tampering) = .036, which is equal 
to the result we obtained using SAMIAM in Exam­
ple 1.1. Both the changes to Pr(tampering) and 
Pr(tampering I e) bring a log-odds difference of .616. 
Theorem 3.3 has a number of implications. First, given 
a particular query Pr(y I e) and a meta parameter 
Txlu• it can be used to bound the effect that a change 
in Txlu will have on the query Pr(y I e). Going back 
to Example 3.2, we may wish to know what is the 
impact on other conditional probabilities if we apply 
the change making Pr' (tampering) = .036. The log­
odds changes for all conditional probabilities in the 
network will be bounded by .616. For example, cur­
rently Pr(fire I e) = .029. Using Theorem 3.3, we can 
find the range of the new conditional probability value 
Pr'(fire I e): l in ( Pr'(fire I e) ) -In (.029) I < _616, 
1-Pr'(fire I e) .971 -
giving us the range .016 :::; Pr'(fire I e) :::; .053. The 
exact value of Pr' (fire I e) , obtained by inference, is 
.021, which is within the computed bounds. 
Second, Theorem 3.3 can be used to efficiently ap­
proximate solutions to the DIFFERENCE and RATIO 
problems we discussed in Section 2. That is, given a 
desirable change in the value of query Pr(y I e), we 
can use Theorem 3.3 to immediately compute a lower 
bound on the minimum change to meta parameter Txlu 
needed to induce the change. This method can be ap­
plied in constant time and can serve as a preliminary 
recommendation, as the method proposed in Section 2 
is much more expensive computationally. 
Third, suppose that SAMlAM was used to recom­
mend parameter changes that would induce a desir­
able change on a given query. Suppose further that 
SAMIAM returned a number of such changes, each of 
which is capable of inducing the necessary change. The 
question is: which one of these changes should we 
adopt? The main principle applied in these situations 
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is to adopt a "minimal" change. But what is mini­
mal in this case? As Theorem 3.3 reveals, a notion of 
minimality which is based on the amount of absolute 
change can be very misleading. Instead, it suggests 
that one adopts the change that minimizes the rela­
tive change in the odds, as other queries can be shown 
to be robust against such a change in a precise sense. 
Finally, the result can be used to obtain a better intu­
itive understanding of parameter changes that do or do 
not matter, a topic which we will discuss in Section 4. 
4 Changes that (don't) matter 
We now return to a central question: When do changes 
in network parameters matter and when do they not 
matter? As we mentioned earlier, there have been 
experimental studies investigating the robustness of 
belief networks against parameter changes. But we 
have also shown very simple and intuitive examples 
where networks can be very sensitive to small param­
eter changes. This calls for a better understanding of 
the effect of parameter changes on queries, so one can 
intuitively sort out situations in which such changes 
do or do not matter. Our goal in this section is to fur­
ther develop such an understanding by looking more 
closely into some of the implications of Theorem 3.3. 
First, we have to settle the issue of "What does it mean 
for a parameter change to matter?" One can think of 
at least three definitions. First, the absolute change in 
the probability Pr(y I e) is smalL Second, the relative 
change in the probability Pr(y I e) is small. Third, 
relative change in the odds of y given e is small. The 
first notion is the one most prevalent in the literature, 
so we shall adopt it in the rest of this section. 
Suppose we have a belief network for a diagnostic ap­
plication and suppose we are concerned about the ro­
bustness of the query Pr(y I e) with respect to changes 
in network parameters. In this application, y is a par­
ticular disease and e is a particular finding which pre­
dicts the disease, with Pr(y I e) = .90. Let us define 
robustness in this case to be an absolute change of no 
more than .05 to the given query. Now, let X be a 
binary variable in the network and let us ask: What 
kind of changes to the parameters on X are guaran­
teed to keep the query within the desirable range? We 
can use Theorem 3.3 easily to answer this question. 
First, if we are changing a parameter by 8, and if we 
want the value of the query to remain :s; .95, we must 
ensure that: 
l ln((p + 8)/(1- p- 8)) -ln(p/(1-p))l $ .7472, 
where .7472 = jln(.95j.05) -ln(.90/.10)1 and p is the 
current value of the parameter. 
Figure 4: The amount of parameter change o that 
would guarantee the query Pr(y I e) = .90 to stay 
within the interval [.85, .95] , as a function of the cur­
rent parameter value p. The outer envelope guarantees 
the query to remain :s; .95, while the inner envelope 
guarantees the query to remain 2:. .85. 
Similarly, if we want to ensure that the query remains 
2:, .85, we want to ensure that: 
lln{(p + 8)/(1- p- 8)) -ln(p/(1-p) ) l :s; .4626, 
where .4626 = lln(.85j.15) -ln(.90/.lO)I. 
Figure 4 plots the permissible change 0 as a function 
of p, the current value of the parameter. The main 
thing to observe here is that the amount of permissible 
change depends on the current value of p, with smaller 
changes allowed for extreme values of p. It is also 
interesting to note that it is easier to guarantee the 
query to stay :s; .95 than to guarantee that it stays 
2:, .85. Therefore, it is more likely for a parameter 
change to reduce the value of a query which is close to 
1 (and to increase the value of a query which is close 
to 0). Finally, if we are increasing the parameter, then 
a parameter value close to .4 would allow the biggest 
change. But if we are decreasing the parameter, then 
a value close to .6 will allow the biggest change. 
Now let us repeat the same exercise but assuming that 
the initial value of the query is Pr(y I e) = .60, yet 
insisting on the same measure of robustness. Figure 5 
plots the permissible changes 8 as a function of p, the 
current value of the parameter. Again, the amount of 
permissible change becomes smaller as the probability 
p approaches 0 or 1. The other main point to em­
phasize is that the permissible changes are now much 
smaller than in the previous example, since the initial 
value of the query is not as extreme. Therefore, this 
query is much less robust than the previous one. 
More generally, Figure 6 plots the log-odd difference, 
lln(O'(x I u)) - ln(O(x I u)) l against Pr(x I u) = p 
and Pr'(x I u) = p + 8. Again, the plot explains 
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Figure 5: The amount of parameter change o that 
would guarantee the query Pr(y I e) = .60 to stay 
within the interval [.55, .65], as a function of the cur­
rent parameter value p. The outer envelope guarantees 
the query to remain � .65, while the inner envelope 
guarantees the query to stay in :2:: .55. 
analytically why we can afford more absolute changes 
to non-extreme probabilities [11, 10]. 
We close this section by emphasizing that the above 
figures identify parameter changes that guarantee to 
keep queries within certain ranges. However, if the 
belief network has specific properties, such as a spe­
cific topology, then it is possible for the query to be 
robust against parameter changes that are outside the 
identified bounds. 
5 Conclusion 
We presented an efficient technique for fine-tuning the 
parameters of a belief network. The technique sug­
gests minimal changes to network parameters which 
ensure that certain constraints are enforced on prob­
abilistic queries. Based on this technique , we have 
experimented with some belief networks, only to find 
out that these networks are more sensitive to param­
eter changes than previous experimental studies seem 
to suggest. This observation lead us to an analytic 
study on the effect of parameter changes, with the 
aim of characterizing situations under which param­
eter changes do or do not matter. We have reported 
on a number of results in this direction. Our cen­
tral result shows that belief networks are robust in a 
very specific sense: the relative change in query odds 
is bounded by the relative change in the parameter 
odds. A closer look at this result, its meaning, and 
its implications provide interesting characterizations 
of parameter changes that do or do not matter, and 
explains analytically some of the previous experimen­
tal results and observations on this matter. 
�lo 
Figure 6: The plot of the log-odd difference, 6.lo = 
l ln(O'(x I u))- ln(O(x I u))l, against Pr(x I u) and 
Pr'(x I u). 
A Proof sketches 
Detailed proofs can be found in [2]. 
Theorem 3.1 
From [3], the derivative 8Pr(y I e)/8flxlu is equal to: 
8Pr(y I e) Pr(y,x, u I e)- Pr(y I e)Pr(x, u I e) 
--��� = --��--�������--�� 8flxlu Pr(x I u) 
Since, we have: 
8Pr(y I e) 
8rxlu 
we can verify that: 
oPr(y I e) 
8rxiu 
8Pr(y I e) oPr(y I e) 
8Bxlu 8t%1u 
Pr(y, x, u I e) - Pr(y I e)Pr(x, u I e) 
Pr(x I u)(l- Pr(x I u)) 
Pr(x I u)(Pr(y, u I e)- Pr(y I e)Pr(u I e)) 
Pr(x I u)(l- Pr(x I u)) 
In order to find an upper bound on the derivative, we 
would like to bound the term Pr(y, x, u I e)- Pr(y I 
e)Pr(x, u I e). We have: 
Pr(y,x, u I e)- Pr(y I e)Pr(x, u I e) 
< Pr(y, x, u I e) - Pr(y I e)Pr(y, x, u I e) 
= Pr(y,x, u I e)(l- Pr(y I e)) 
< Pr(y, u I e)(l- Pr(y I e)). 
UA\2001 CHAN & DARWlCHE 73 
Therefore, the upper bound on the derivative can be 
verified as: 
[)Pr(y I e) 
O'Tx[u 
:S Pr(y, u I e)(1- Pr(y I e)) 
Pr(x I u)(1- Pr(x I u) )  
Pr(x I u)(Pr(y, u I e)- Pr(y I e)Pr(u I e)) 
Pr(x I u)(1- Pr(x I u)) 
Pr(y I e)Pr(y, u I e) Pr(y I e)Pr(y, u I e) 
= 
Pr(x I u) + 1 - Pr(x I u) · 
Since Pr(y, u I e) :S Pr(y I e) and Pr(y, u I e) < 
Pr(y I e), the upper bound on the derivative is: 
8Pr(y l e) 
O'Tx[u 
< Pr(y I e)Pr(y I e) + Pr(y I e)Pr(y I e) 
Pr(x I u) 1 - Pr(x I u) 
Pr(y I e)(1- Pr(y I e)) 
Pr(x I u)(1- Pr(x I u)) · 
Similarly, we can prove the lower bound on the deriva­
tive as: 
a Pr(y I e) > -_P_ r..:::_(Y__,!.I _e ):....:.(_1 -_P_ r(:,::.Y....:_I_;e ):..:....) 
O'Tx[u - Pr(x I u)(1- Pr(x I u)) · 
Theorem 3.2 
Because .1.7:z:[u is infinitesimal, from Theorem 3.1: 
< 
I oPr(y I e) I O'Tx[u 
Pr(y I e)(l- Pr(y I e)) 
Pr(x I u)(1- Pr(x I u)) · 
Arranging the terms, we have: 
I D.Pr(y I e) I Pr(y I e) < 
< 
1 - Pr(y I e) I Ll'Tx[u I 
1 - Pr(x I u) 'T,x[u 
� I d'T,[u I == 21 d'T;,[u I . .5 'T:z:[u Tx[u 
since Pr(x I u) = 'T:z:[u :S .5. 
Theorem 3.3 
We obtain this result by integrating the bound in 
Theorem 3.1. In particular, if we change T:z:[u to 
r�lu > T:z:[u1 and consequently Pr(y I e) changes to 
Pr' (y I e), we can separate the variables in the upper 
bound on the derivative in Theorem 3.1, and integrate 
over the intervals, and yield: 
{Pr'(y[e) dPr(y I e) < 1"'�1u d'T:z:[u 
lPr(y[e) Pr(y I e)(l- Pr(y I e)) - 'rxlu 'T:z:[u(1- T:z:[u). 
This gives us the solution: 
ln(Pr'(y I e)) - ln(Pr(y I e))­
ln(1- Pr'(y I e))+ ln(1 - Pr(y I e)) 
< 
ln(r�IJ-ln(rxlu) -ln(l-'T�Iu) + ln(1- T:z:[u), 
and after taking exponentials, we have: 
Pr'(y I e)/(1- Pr'(y I e)) < 7�tuf(l- 7�1u) 
Pr(y I e)/(1- Pr(y I e)) - 'Tx[u/(1- 'T:z:[u)' 
which is equivalent to: 
_O'....:.::: (Y...,:...I-"-e) < _O'_(x_ ) 
O(y I e) - O(x ) · 
The other parts of Theorem 3.3 can be proved simi­
larly. 
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